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The Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis: 
The economics, politics, and ethics of response 
 
James Brassett, Lena Rethel and Matthew Watson 
 
Media and policy discourses on the subprime crisis and the ensuing credit crunch have 
been dominated by historical analogies, whereby a sense of how bad things have been 
since the autumn of 2007 arises from comparing the situation directly to other notable 
moments of financial meltdown. Typical of this approach is the measured insistence 
of the Chair of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, that the spiral of illiquidity 
which engulfed the banking sector in September 2008 provided the most serious 
threat of systematic bank collapses since the Great Depression. Such constructions are 
clearly not without justification. Commercial banks have been nationalised at a rate 
unprecedented in recent memory; the once seemingly omnipresent giant US 
investment banks have failed to survive in their extant form; the UK has witnessed its 
first genuine run-on-the-bank dynamics since the middle of the nineteenth century; the 
interest rate spread between inter-bank lending and government bonds has reached 
record highs almost worldwide; and the drying up of mortgage lending has led to 
record annual falls in house prices in many countries. However, as an explanatory 
device, inference by historical analogy alone places unnecessary and unhelpful 
restrictions on attempts to understand how events surrounding the sub-prime crisis 
and its associated credit crunch have unfolded. 
 
Linking the present to the past in this way suggests that the current crisis is merely a 
moment of instability, puncturing an otherwise stable financial environment with a 
temporary mishap occasioned by an equally temporary misallocation of bank 
resources. From such a perspective, all that might be necessary for the status quo ante 
to be revived is decisive intervention designed to rid current conditions of their 
anomalies through increased emphasis on transparency and accountability. Perhaps 
predictably in such circumstances, the mantra of good governance to counter 
conflicted interests in the banking sector has been dusted down and given new life as 
a catch-all antidote to ostensible historical abnormalities in finance. The rhetoric of 
“seriously delinquent” finance emerging from within the IMF (Dodd 2007) has 
underpinned calls for enhanced levels of bank self-restraint; the UK Chancellor 
Alistair Darling‟s reflections on the social irresponsibility of some bankers‟ 
“kamikaze manner” do likewise (Darling 2009). Such appeals invite the possibility of 
a future exclusion whereby rogue lenders are forced out of the market in order to 
revive the functioning financial system which will be left behind once they have been 
expelled. 
 
Here, though, the proffered solution to the crisis pre-empts genuine analysis of its 
causes by enforcing the characterisation of their manifestations as abnormalities. 
What if instead the problem from which the subprime crisis arose is actually the very 
essence of modern banking sector „normality‟ (Brassett, Rethel and Watson 2009: 
378)? On this view the sub-prime crisis is not a moment of instability in an otherwise 
well-ordered political settlement for finance, so much as a signal event highlighting 
deeper changes and probable contradictions related to the ongoing financialisation of 
global capitalism.
1
 The unparalleled expansion of individual credit and debt in recent 
years has led to concerted efforts on the part of banks to commodify the financial 
aspirations of everyday investors by innovating in risk management techniques related 
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to asset securitisation. The sheer normality of highly leveraged trading in these assets 
points to an urgent systemic question; the sheer normality of catering for people‟s 
financial security through embedding their accumulated wealth in speculative asset 
price movements points to another. In this way, we believe that the subprime crisis 
can be usefully (re-)read as the fulcrum of wider social and moral shifts in the nature 
of debt, risk and expectations regarding responsible financial behaviour. The question 
of responding to the sub-prime crisis therefore moves beyond technical fixes to 
improve the allocative efficiency of the banking sector and is bound up with deeper 
political and ethical commitments to how finance should be organised and in whose 
interest that organisation should take place. 
 
An important issue for scholars seeking to develop such a theme is where they might 
turn for literature to assist them in that task. As is perhaps to be expected of events 
that crystallised in their most dramatic form only eighteen months ago, the academic 
literature is still somewhat sparse. Some modern classics on general conditions of 
financial uncertainty have been either reprinted in their original form in order to allow 
today‟s readers to draw their own implications about the sub-prime crisis (e.g., 
Minsky 2008 [1986]) or reprinted with brief additional chapters devoted to the crisis 
(e.g., Krugman 2008 [1999]). To a significant extent it is still just too soon for an 
autonomous specialist academic literature to have evolved and to have settled into 
consistent patterns of scholarship. It should hopefully go without saying that it is one 
of the primary objectives of this special issue to begin to map out how those patterns 
might be established in the future. 
 
This is not to suggest, though, that there has been no academic input thus far into 
media and policy discourses surrounding the sub-prime crisis. Many publishers 
spotted an important opportunity very early on in the unfolding of the crisis to 
commission academics and other opinion-formers with public profiles to comment on 
events as close as possible to their origins (e.g., Shiller 2008; Soros 2008). The 
audience to whom these books are designed to appeal is not, however, an academic 
audience. Therefore there is a tendency for their analyses to concentrate on the surface 
relationships underpinning falling house prices and stalling credit markets rather than 
on the broader capitalist restructuring which has made the manifestation of these 
surface relationships largely unremarkable. They are almost always silent on the 
process through which credit expansion, the commodification of future welfare needs 
and the purposeful creation of bubble dynamics are all somewhat predictable 
outcomes of an increasingly financialised model of capitalism. The focus on why 
house prices have fallen and why credit markets have stalled might well recognise 
some of these features but hardly ever attributes them to the normal workings of 
contemporary finance. Our contributors were asked to think specifically about such 
connections as a means of transcending explanations based on purely surface 
relationships. 
 
Another literature whose major themes will not be replicated in our contributors‟ 
work is that written by journalists specialising on the mortgage lending market and on 
the activities of modern investment banking corporations. The former have pinpointed 
with great skill the decisive moments in which seemingly sustainable business models 
linked to an unusually buoyant housing market spilled over into wilful lending 
excesses (e.g., Muolo and Padilla 2008; Mason 2009). The resulting analysis often 
morphs into popular psychological studies of key industry insiders‟ motivations for 
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riding the house price bubble for all it was worth. The second prominent journalistic 
contribution has been to produce similarly-styled accounts of how investment banks 
reorganised their internal operations to create additional space for their activities in 
the mortgage securitisation market (e.g., Cohan 2009; McDonald and Robinson 
2009). Once more, personalities come to the fore in the explanation of how the market 
was made and how its reproduction was undermined by the increasingly reckless 
positions being taken within it. 
 
What follows now is a collection of eight original research-based articles which 
depart from so much of the existing writing on the sub-prime crisis in their conscious 
prioritisation of distinctly academic approaches to the subject matter. Each piece 
stands alone on its own merits and we do not wish to falsely impute a consistent 
narrative of response which was no part of our contributors‟ intentions. However, it is 
possible to order the articles into three loose groupings. The first focuses more on the 
international level, while the second highlights the implications of conceptualising 
adequate responses for a politics of the everyday. The third relates the sub-prime 
crisis to wider social dynamics of financial markets and the broader restructuring of 
an increasingly financialised capitalism. 
 
Turning initially to the first grouping, the articles by Jacqueline Best and Grahame 
Thompson view the current crisis in comparative perspective in order to understand 
what lessons global policy elites have applied when attempting to ameliorate the 
symptoms of financial market distress during the credit crunch. For Best, the question 
is how responses to the current crisis have failed – and quite conspicuously so – to 
learn from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s amid protracted and ultimately 
unsatisfactory debates over a New Financial Architecture. Contingent ambiguities in 
financial knowledge and practice are the very stuff of repeated financial crises, and 
reading history forwards from the meltdown of Asian markets to today shows that 
such ambiguities have never been mastered via ever more complex risk management 
techniques that emerge from within markets themselves. The very fact that we have a 
sub-prime crisis to write about indicates that the packaging and re-packaging of risk 
perpetuates more risk. This is because the definition of what within the financial 
sector counts as risk in the first place has itself become an aspect of market self-
regulation and therefore is distorted by the outbreaks of the bubble dynamics which 
are a constant feature of financialised capitalism. Like many of our contributors Best 
shies away from advocating purely technical responses to be pursued within the 
context of continued market self-regulation, on precisely the grounds that it was such 
techniques which produced the current situation. Instead, she advocates a multi-
faceted response when viewed internationally, one in which different national 
economic value systems produce different policy outcomes when released from the 
homogenising influence of globally-imposed norms. 
 
Thompson‟s primary conclusion largely concurs with Best‟s. He interrogates the 
widespread understanding that the circumstances in evidence since the autumn of 
2007 constitute a distinctly „global‟ crisis. He argues that quite apart from there being 
a global financial system, what we in fact see is a set of nationally demarcated 
systems and that the global spread of the Anglo-American debt credit crunch is in fact 
merely a classic case of contagion with symptoms jumping from one system to the 
next. Thompson gives short shrift to the suggestion that the international economy 
exhibits seamless integration of national financial markets, demonstrating his point 
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through analysing the structural disjuncture between different spatial scales of finance 
which is caused by the continuing presence of different national currencies. On this 
basis he supports the idea that the regulatory response should be founded on the 
principle of „distributed preparedness for resilience‟ instead of another set of top-
down rules issued by the institutions of global economic governance in the name of a 
New Financial Architecture. This is the functional equivalent of Best‟s multi-faceted 
response, because it entails each country constructing its resilience in its own way, 
depending on the precise features of the national economic system. 
 
The final piece of the first grouping is written by Duncan Wigan. Along with the 
subsequent articles by Paul Langley and Timothy Sinclair, the broad theme of 
response is dealt with most stridently here. Each of these articles chimes with a stance 
of critical questioning along the lines: „Response? What response?‟ In this sense they 
seek to explore the issue of power in global finance and the way it operates through 
private and discursive channels to consolidate certain conceptions of „normal‟ 
finance. Wigan provides a cutting account of the way in which successive cycles of 
crisis and re-regulation have entrenched globally the power of finance in general and 
the role of derivatives in particular. He argues that the focus of crisis analysis should 
shift from the dominant narrative of pathology contained in the comparison of bubble 
and post-bubble asset price dynamics to the question of power. In Wigan‟s account 
the policy prescriptions of crisis abatement strategies – in particular the now fabled 
bank bail-out packages – have served predominantly to reproduce the circumstances 
that have created finance as we now know it and which render the contradictions of a 
financialised capitalism an increasingly normal characteristic of everyday life. He 
treats this as the most obvious symptom of the state‟s impotence when it comes to the 
control of financial innovation. Private actors, he argues, now define the parameters 
of feasible public responses to moments of financial market meltdown; the prospects 
of escaping these privately-imposed norms are distant indeed. 
 
The articles by Paul Langley and Leonard Seabrooke form the second grouping. They 
tackle more directly the salience of finance for the politics of „everyday life‟ and its 
effective instantiation in responses to the subprime crisis. Langley provides a 
technically sophisticated and authoritative treatment of performativity and what it 
implies for the analysis of financial markets. His underlying point is that the dominant 
media and policy discourses linking the crisis to a sudden outbreak of illiquidity pre-
empted anything more concerted than a really rather superficial examination of 
alternative responses. If illiquidity promotes market meltdowns, so the reasoning ran, 
the only possible source of ameliorating continuing market distress is to make markets 
liquid again. It is interesting to note in passing that the small print of the bank bail-out 
packages introduced around the world from the autumn of 2008 has all cited this as 
the priority of policy. Langley shows that this particular technical diagnosis of the 
troubles that befell financial markets simultaneously performs its own intended 
solution: to make markets liquid again on the presumption that liquid markets are 
functioning markets and that functioning markets represent their socially optimal 
form. He suggests that the question of whether securitisation techniques have an 
ethically and politically legitimate place in the provision of mortgage finance was 
never seriously considered. Instead, the emphasis of the bail-outs was governed by the 
fetishising of liquidity and, as a consequence, the sole concern was how to re-start 
securitisation as quickly as possible. 
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In his contribution, Seabrooke also discusses the range of possible decisions that 
could be made around the issue of re-starting securitisation, although he focuses 
explicitly on the question of how to re-start it whereas Langley‟s piece pushes readers 
to consider rather more whether it should be re-started. Seabrooke‟s discussion is 
situated analytically at the nexus of the relationship between individual life chances 
and welfare trade-offs that underpin phenomena like sub-prime lending. He outlines 
how mass expectations concerning access to credit in the US – as well as in other 
similarly-positioned Anglophone economies – place hard constraints on the policy 
space for regulatory reform and that the demands arising from the political system 
come close to ruling out the option of not re-starting mortgage securitisation. 
However, the everyday politics of getting access to credit raises not only issues of 
creditworthiness but, in the US at least, issues of race and discrimination. Seabrooke 
concludes that the ongoing efforts to use part of the bail-out money to restart 
securitisation must account for the social structures embedded within everyday 
politics. As a result, he raises the possibility that a radical regulatory overhaul of the 
US mortgage regime are most unlikely, because the racialised dimension of credit 
creation is a limiting factor on the social and political breadth of financial norms. 
 
The third grouping of articles relates the subprime crisis to broader social dynamics of 
financial markets in the manner prefigured in Seabrooke‟s analysis. The power-
centred approach which is a dominant feature of the pieces by Wigan and Langley 
also shines through the piece by Sinclair. He analyses the „othering‟ practices of 
media and policy discourses that work to identify perpetrators in the crisis. Focusing 
on the bond rating agencies he identifies an interesting politics in the discourse of 
„moral panic‟ that works to discipline particular instances of financial innovation 
while paradoxically sidelining critical claims about the inherent problems of global 
finance. These othering practices consequently play a normalising role which 
squeezes the space for discussing how the power manifested in global finance draws 
attention away from its generic contradictions when issues of regulation come to the 
fore. From Sinclair‟s perspective there is doubtless plenty of critical noise in 
commentaries on the sub-prime crisis, but it invariably works to produce scapegoats at 
the same time as diminishing opportunities to question the morality of particular 
social structures of debt and to suggest alternative practices of finance. In this case the 
distribution of power lying behind the surface relationships of reputations for 
creditworthiness remains crucially unexplored. 
 
The argument of Julie Froud and her co-authors complements the arguments in the 
previous two pieces. They offer a powerful critique of the justifications advanced by 
policy-making elites concerning the allegedly benign effects of financialisation and 
the opportunities that financialisation offers for the creation of new cadres of asset-
holders. Even though their article follows neither Seabrooke‟s nor Sinclair‟s in 
engaging explicitly with responses to the current crisis, it does provide salutary 
lessons on much of the back-story to their analyses. It shows how the intrusion of 
ethical discourses of finance via issues of „financial democracy‟ and the „ownership 
society‟ can silence potential agents of political mobilisation against today‟s normal 
finance far more effectively than they help to energise such struggles. Many recent 
attempts have been made to ameliorate the pathologies of unequal earned income via 
the creation of credit lines for low-income families in the interests of homeownership, 
pension provision and savings. Froud et al argue that such „social innovations‟ 
actually serve to further entrench the inequalities that their proponents claim they 
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solve. They suggest that one possible resolution to the current crisis might emerge 
from a new class alignment whose political form relegates the emphasis on rising 
asset prices below traditional social democratic concerns like income distribution and 
social protection. 
 
Finally, the article by Ismail Ertürk et al provides an exciting response to the ongoing 
difficulties encountered within media and policy discourses of providing an adequate 
specification of the core characteristics of hedge funds. Hedge funds have recently 
come under increased scrutiny because they have been so much a part of the „blame 
game‟ surrounding the sub-prime crisis – similarly to Sinclair‟s sense of „perpetrators‟ 
– but they remain largely mysterious and therefore often escape serious analytical 
study. Ertürk et al elaborate a conceptual deconstruction of the prevalent images of 
hedge funds as either trader/arbitrageurs or speculator/gamblers. For them the 
appropriate metaphor is „war machine‟, one which offers a more dynamic vision of 
how they act not only as traders but also as conscious manipulators of the „battlefield‟ 
on which trading strategies emerge. Hedge funds‟ activities are dominated not by any 
transcendent approach to how to operate within the market environment, but by a 
series of short-term interventions designed to do whatever it takes in order to 
reconstitute the core features of the market to their own advantage. Deception, threat 
and tactical alliance are all shown to be part of hedge funds‟ strategic repertoire if this 
is what is required to „make their positions work‟ and therefore to maximise the 
returns on their investments. Such war machines exist in specific conjunctures and 
adapt and respond to the challenges of the prevailing battlefield – in this instance the 
rapid withdrawal of liquidity associated with the sub-prime crisis. The consciously 
conjunctural analysis provided by Ertürk et al tells us much about the conditions of 
normal finance out of which the current crisis arose. 
 
 





 This was the alternative proposition that the participants were asked to consider at the two-day 
workshop out of which this special issue was put together. The workshop was held at the University of 
Warwick on 18/19 September 2008. We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the host 
institution, the Economic and Social Research Council (project number RES-000-22-2198), GARNET 
– the EU Network of Excellence on Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation and the 
Political Studies Association of the UK. More information about the workshop appears at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/ipe/subprime/, including links to the recordings of all 
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